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ABSTRACT
This article aims at addressing the relationship between expertise and politics by examining
a reorganization process of Statistics Norway. The puzzle is why a minor reorganization with
low political salience, in a consensus-oriented political administrative setting with high level of
trust between ministries and agencies, and high autonomy for agencies ended up as a major
conflict resulting in the resignation of the agency director. Based on an instrumental, a cultural
and a symbolic perspective the article examines the internal and external dynamics ensuing from
conflicting views regarding the balance between political control and professional autonomy, and
from reorganization proposals that represented a break with the cultural path the organization
had followed. It adds insights into the tensions between different types of institutional logics,






A classical theme in public administration research is
the tension and challenges in the relationship between
politics and administration. Further, the relationship
between politics, knowledge and expertise is also
a widely addressed topic (Gora, Holst, & Warat,
2018). A central aspect of this is the balance between
political control and professional autonomy. On the
one hand, elected political leaders should be able to
control the subordinated public bureaucracy and its
civil servants (Weaver & Rockman, 1993). On the
other hand, civil servants should have significant pro-
fessional freedom, because professional competence
forms the backbone of any public organization, both
through factual and normative decision premises
(Simon, 1957). Professional neutrality of the bureau-
cracy is crucial, because whereas political executives
come and go, professional civil servants are expected
to serve governments of any political stripe.
A related aspect is how the relationship between
a superior ministry and a subordinate agency should
be organized and how it functions in practice. Different
countries have chosen quite different models, ranging
from integrated agencies, through semi-dependent
agencies to rather independent agencies, where the
potential influence of the professional group is highest.
With the New Public Management reform wave, the
tendency was towards ‘agencification’ with substantial
agency autonomy; this became a fashionable reform
template that has spread around the world (Pollitt,
Bathgate, Caulfield, & Smullen, 2001). Agencies should
have more managerial autonomy but not more policy
autonomy, and managerial accountability should be
strengthened without weakening political accountabil-
ity (Lægreid, 2014). A wide variety of agency studies
have shown that agencies may have a differentiated
control and autonomy regime, where certain aspects
are more autonomous than others (Verhoest, Van
Thiel, Bouckaert, & Lægreid, 2012).
Autonomy for agencies is always relative, because
most countries have a type of ministerial responsibility
system where ministers are ultimately accountable to
the legislative body/parliament for everything that
goes on within their portfolio. This means that min-
isters are accountable for the activities of subordinate
agencies. In contrast to the US spoil system, the
agency directors in Western parliamentarian systems
are supposed to serve changing political masters.
Adding to this, the West-Nordic tradition, encompass-
ing Norway and Denmark, is typical for relative stron-
ger hierarchical steering from the ministries (Greve,
Lægreid, & Rykkja, 2016). Lack of congruence to
a spoil system might reduce the external validity of
this study while the strong ministerial responsibility
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might improve the external validity also for a spoil
system context.
Political executives in modern public organizations
where subordinate levels have significant autonomy
face several challenges. One is that political leaders are
not fully informed about, nor can they always influence
what goes on in subordinate units, while at the same
time they get the blame if something goes wrong
(Brunsson, 1989). In the aftermath of management
reforms, there has been several prominent examples
of resignation of agency heads, for example, in the
UK (Polidano, 1999) and in New Zealand (Wallis,
2001). Studies show that broad and consensus-based
reorganizations normally are the most successful
(Greve et al., 2016).
The story told in this article starts in 2016 with an
internal reorganization process at Statistics Norway
(SSB), subordinated to the Ministry of Finance, and it
ends with the resignation of its director in
November 2017. It involves two differing narratives.
The first, asserted by the director, was that her mandate
as a new director was to reorganize the agency; that she
had support in the agency and of the political and
administrative leaders in the ministry to do so; and
that it came as a surprise when the Minister of
Finance opposed the reorganization and did not trust
the director. The second narrative, maintained by the
minister, was that the ministry had warned the director
rather early in the process that her proposed changes in
the Research Department in the agency would under-
mine the so-called ‘societal mission’ of the agency. This
narrative was supported by the main employees’ and
employers’ associations.
Accordingly, we will focus on the following research
questions:
● The overall puzzle in this process is why
a seemingly minor reorganization, with low poli-
tical saliency, in a normally consensus-oriented
political-administrative setting with a high level
of trust between ministries and agencies and rela-
tively high autonomy for executive agencies,
ended up as a major conflict resulting in the
resignation of agency director?
● How can we explain the thinking and actions of
the main actors in the process? Was it an instru-
mental conflict over the balance between political
control and institutional autonomy, a cultural
conflict over the professional norms the statistics
administration should build on, or was the process
characterized by ambiguity and the use of strong
symbols?
The article starts by some conceptual clarifications and
outlining the theoretical framework. This is followed by
some context about the agency system in Norway. We
then tell the story leading up to the director’s resigna-
tion, tracing the two narratives. Finally, we analyze the
findings based on the theoretical perspectives and for-
mulate some conclusions and lessons.
Conceptual clarification – scientification,
agencification and autonomy
There is an increasing reliance on scientific expertise in
policymaking and there is a claim of ‘scientification’ or
‘expertization ‘of political life (Weingast, 1999, Turner,
Fischer, 2009). Especially the role of economic expertise
(Christensen, 2018) as well as the role of semi-
independent agencies dominated by economists has
been addressed (Marcussen, 2006). A core question
has been the relationship between scientific expertise
and political accountability. Weingast (1999) claims
that the simultaneous scientification of politics and
the politicisation of science has become de-
legitimized. Despite the loss of authority of scientific
expertise, policymakers do not abandon their reliance
on existing advisory arrangements, nor do experts
adapt their ideas on science and its relations to politics.
This article addresses this paradox and discusses how
this stability can be achieved and institutionalized.
Expert bodies such as central agencies have
increased their power and autonomy and a good exam-
ple of this is the state agencies. The autonomy of central
agencies has been a focus of many extensive public
organization research efforts (Pollitt, Talbot, Caulfield,
& Smullen, 2004; Verhoest, Roness, Verschuere,
Rubecksen, & MacCarthaigh, 2010; Verhoest et al.,
2012). The autonomy concept in public administration
research is multi-faceted, multi-dimensional and
ambiguous (Olsen, 2009; Verhoest, Guy Peters,
Bouckaert, & Verschhuere, 2004). The core aim of
bureaucratic autonomy is for civil servants to be able
to translate their own preferences into authoritative
actions without external constraints (Maggetti, 2007;
Maggetti & Verhoest, 2014).
One can distinguish between formal autonomy, per-
ceived autonomy and actual autonomy, and in general
the subjective, dynamic and relative nature of auton-
omy needs to be acknowledged (Roness, Verhoest,
Rubecksen, & MacCarthaigh, 2008). Agency executives
will often act upon the autonomy that they perceive
they have, rather than just following the formal affilia-
tion of their organization (Yesilkagit & Van Thiel,
2008). Agency autonomy seems to be affected by
a complex mixture of tasks, organizational forms and
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national path dependencies (Maggetti & Verhoest,
2014). Agencification tends to reduce political control,
but within the principle of ministerial responsibility.
Based on these distinctions, is the process characterized
by the director focusing on perceived autonomy and
the minister on actual autonomy?
Agency autonomy is also linked to reputation.
Carpenter (2001) sees it as political capacity forged
over time through networks and reputation. More
agency autonomy implies shifting decision-making
competency from the parent ministry to the agency
itself by reducing regulation and ex ante approval
requirements. Verhoest et al. (2004) distinguish
between managerial, policy and structural autonomy.
An agency may have managerial autonomy with respect
to organizational management but not policy auton-
omy regarding discretion in designing policy instru-
ments and implementation. Structural autonomy is
the extent to which the agency is shielded from minis-
terial influence through hierarchy and accountability. Is
the process studied here characterized by the director
focusing on managerial autonomy, while the minister
tries to restrict policy and structural autonomy?
To see autonomy as detachment from politics and
the apolitical dynamics of reformers has clear limita-
tions (Maor, 1999; Olsen, 2009). There might be
a dynamic interplay between political control and
agency autonomy and it might be difficult to find
a stable balance between democratic governance and
autonomous agencies. Demands for more autonomy
from the parent ministry might depend less on the
scope of external interference than on which interven-
tions are perceived as inappropriate or illegitimate (cf.
March & Olsen, 1989).
Theoretical perspectives – instruments, culture
and symbol
We will address the tension between expert knowledge
and political steering by applying three organization
theory perspectives used as complementary explana-
tions or interpretations (Christensen, Lægreid, Roness,
& Røvik, 2007). An instrumental perspective on reorga-
nizations regards the political and administrative lea-
dership as rather influential in public decision-making
processes, scoring high on both political-administrative
control and rational calculation, i.e. clear means-end
thinking. Leaders can either have hierarchical control
and engage in negotiations and strike compromises
(Allison, 1971; Cyert & March, 1963; March & Olsen,
1983).
Applying an instrumental perspective to our case
would first be to analyze the actions and perceptions
of the executive leadership in the ministry and the
director related to the autonomy question. Included in
this is whether the ministry supported the director, or
quite the opposite, warn her against the direction the
reorganization was taking. Second, was there
a negotiation process going on between the ministry
and the director, leading the director to modify her
proposals? What were the role of other internal and
external stakeholders in the conflict?
According to a cultural perspective, change processes
tend to be rather slow and evolutionary, where informal
norms and values are developed as a result of adapting
to both internal and external pressure (Selznick, 1957).
The importance of path-dependency implies that cul-
tural norms and values of change efforts have to be
compatible with historical traditions (Yesilkagit &
Christensen, 2009). Another and similar mechanism is
the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1989).
A public institution will develop over a long of period
time a dominant view of what kind of action is cultu-
rally appropriate, and this is enacted in situations when
situations and cultural identities are matched with cer-
tain decision-making rules.
Applying the cultural perspective to our case, some
central questions are evident. First, did the director of
the agency try to break with the cultural path of the
agency, and what reactions did this lead to by potential
veto players and supporters? Second, did the minister
act in a culturally appropriate way towards the director
and the agency?
Seen from a symbolic perspective, reorganization pro-
cesses will mostly be about the social construction of
reality, window-dressing and symbols (Meyer & Rowan,
1977). Leaders use symbols to convince their own orga-
nization or external stakeholders that their approach are
the only way forward (Røvik, 2002). Often they use
double-talk, meaning that they talk in one way and act
in another (Brunsson, 1989). Symbols are used to provide
flexibility and to increase support and legitimacy, and
their use is made more easy by the existence of ambiguity
in processes of change (March & Olsen, 1976).
Applying a symbolic perspective to our case raises
questions such as what were the main symbols the
director used in her campaign to implement the reor-
ganization and convince the ministry, and what were
the main symbols in the minister’s actions or reactions?
Are there signs of symbolic post-rationalization in their
arguments related to the autonomy question? What
were the main symbolic arguments of other internal
and external stakeholders, and did those relate closely
to the ones of the central actors?
Based on these perspectives we would expect the
following:
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● The minister is using her potentially strong power
to trump the potential autonomy of the agency,
including the agency director’s intentions to con-
trol hierarchically the reorganization process in
the agency.
● The historical-cultural path of the agency is
important for the internal resistance in the agency
towards the reorganization.
● The minister is supposed to use symbols of poli-
tical urgency and broader societal interests, and
the agency director uses symbols of autonomy, to
further their case in public.
Contextual features
Norway’s policy-making style is consensus-based and is
characterized by collaboration, consultation and the
involvement of affected stakeholders and unions
(Greve et al., 2016; Olsen, Roness, & Sætren, 1982).
The central civil service is professional and merito-
cratic. There is a relatively high level of mutual trust
between ministries and central agencies (Christensen &
Lægreid, 2005). The degree of perceived autonomy of
central agencies is higher and the degree of politiciza-
tion is lower among top civil servants in Norway than
in many other European countries (Egeberg & Trondal,
2009; Greve et al., 2016). This is especially the case
when it comes to managerial autonomy and politicians’
acceptance of the professional competence of civil ser-
vants. In addition, politicians normally do not interfere
in the appointment of top civil servants in ministries
and central agencies (Christensen, Egeberg, Lægreid, &
Trondal, 2018).
Norway has a long tradition of central agencies
(Christensen, 2003). There has been a tension on how
to organize and balance ministerial responsibility with
agency autonomy, and the trade-off between the two
has varied over time, but within the overall principle of
ministerial responsibility. This implies strong line min-
istries, resulting in departmentalization and ‘silo’ think-
ing with relatively good vertical coordination within
each ministerial area. From the 1960s a main govern-
ance doctrine has been that the ministries should be
a secretariat for the political executive, while the agen-
cies should have assignments that are more profes-
sional, implementing public policy and providing
services, regulation and surveillance. In recent decades
an agencification process has been going on in Norway
in which the agencies have become larger, more auton-
omous and influential (Christensen et al., 2018).
The central agencies are part of the central govern-
ment administration and directly subordinate to the
ministries but structurally disaggregated from the min-
istries. They carry out public tasks on a permanent
basis, are staffed by civil servants, are subject to public
law procedures, and are financed mainly by the state
budget. The central agencies are subject to general
government regulatory frameworks (Lægreid, Roness,
& Rubecksen, 2012). They are semi-autonomous orga-
nizations without legal independence but with some
managerial and professional autonomy (Van Thiel,
2012, p. 20). The top executives in the central agencies
are appointed by the government for a fixed term. Most
agencies have no executive board. Normally reorgani-
zation of central government is a prerogative for the
government. Internal reorganizations in agencies are
normally delegated to the agency if they are not too
big or controversial.
Statistics Norway was established in 1876 and has
over time had a strong professional reputation and
autonomy. It is one of the largest central agencies in
Norway with about 850 employees. It has seven depart-
ments, including three for statistics and one for
research. It is subordinated to the Ministry of
Finance, established in 1814 and the most influential
ministry, and it also has an executive board appointed
by the government. The board decides on the agency’s
program and budget, proposed by the director, and it
has a scrutiny function. The board does not appoint the
director and remains on the sidelines in the steering
dialogue between the ministry and the director based
on a performance management system.
All directors have historically been trained as macro-
economists, often from the University of Oslo. Most of
them have had a long career with Statistics Norway and
there have also been frequent mobility between
Statistics Norway and the Ministry of Finance. The
appointment of a new director in 2015 was a break
with this tradition. The director had a background as
a professor in strategy and management from the
Norwegian School of Economics and came from out-
side after being director of the Competition Authority.
The appointment was controversial. The lead econo-
mist at LO, the largest employees’ organization, criti-
cized the new director for lacking the necessary
qualifications for the job, which mainly meant not
being a macroeconomist. Like several of the predeces-
sors, she also had a political career. She had been state
secretary in the Ministry of Public Administration. In
contrast to her predecessors, her political career was
not in the Labour Party but in the Conservative Party.
From 2013, Norway has had a coalition government
formed by the Conservatives and the Progress Party. It
was supported in the parliament by the Liberals and the
Christian People’s Party. The leader of the Progress
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Party, Siv Jensen, was the minister of finance in the
period studied.
Summing up, the ministry–agency relations have
overall been well defined, long lasting and stable. The
relationship between the ministry and agency has been
peaceful and constructive, with unambiguous role
enactment. In this picture, the highly unusual conflict
unfolding in the analyzed process, may lead to the
question of whether one is dealing with a critical or
crucial case (Levy, 2008), which have a broader analy-
tical and empirical interest.
A short methodological note
The study is based on extensive public documents, both
internal and external on the reorganization process,
detailed minutes from the public hearings as well as
media coverage so it is very well documented. The Bye
Committee (2017), based in SSB, discussed the devel-
opment and functions/role of the agency and proposed
changes. The director then based her proposals for
internal reorganizations on the report, making it the
basis for her views and later narrative.
Second, The Standing Committee on Scrutiny and
Constitutional Affairs (SCSCA) in Parliament posed, in
several rounds, a lot of questions to the Ministry of
Finance about the process and got long and detailed
answers, making the process more open for analysis than
normally the case. There were also two open and broad-
casted parliamentary hearings in 2018 about the case, where
all the major actors gave detailed answers to the questions
from the MPs, which makes the process even more open.
The two main narratives described above were obvious in
these proceedings. The handling from the committee ended
up in a report (Innst.199 S (2017–2018), with opposing
views of the process. There also existed sub-narratives,
like between economists, but they aligned very much with
the twomain ones, and they are only briefly mention. Since
the focus is on how the conflict between the minister and
director played out in public, we did not collect data on
eventual differences in views inside the ministries and
agency, which would anyhow be difficult after such
a strong conflict.
Third, a public commission on the new law on
statistics (NOU, 2018: 7), discussed the more principle
question of the relationship between the ministry and
agency. Fourth, the case had very extensive media cov-
erage, including press conferences given by both the
minister and the director.
The strengths of the data are the quite open, unusual
dense and extensive coverage of the process, which make
the content analysis more thorough, both regarding the
instrumental and cultural aspects. The widely spread oral
parts of it also give more insight into the symbols used.
The only part of the process that is not documented
much is the internal process in the ministry. One get
a glimpse of that in internal ministerial notes from meet-
ings with the director, partly corrected, that the parlia-
mentary committee demanded. We decided, based on the
depth of the data collected, not to conduct interviews on
this, but interviews with central actors have been done
for a master thesis and they confirm the main arguments
in our analysis (Moseng, 2019).
Main events in the reorganization process
The timelines of the main events in the case are
summed up in Table 1.
The process started in 2016 when Statistics
Norway appointed a committee to discuss the future
research strategy of the agency. This committee’s
report submitted in January 2017, embraced by the
director, proposed a radical reorganization of its
research division (RD). The board was reluctant to
accept the proposed changes, and so were allegedly
also the ministry. But, the director continue to pur-
sue and detailed the proposed change, spurring both
internal and external resistance. In the late fall, the
process became more intense, with several meetings
between the director and the ministry, and it became
more public with an intense debate between different
views. Finally, the ministry put the process on hold
and the director agreed to leave her position in
November 2017 amidst strong conflicts over how to
interpret the process. The process ended in 2018 by
public hearings in the SCSCA followed by a general
debate in the Parliament (2018a, 2018b, 2018c).
The Bye committee on reorganization
In August 2016 the leadership of SSB appointed
a committee headed by one of the research directors
from SSB that formally started the internal moderniza-
tion project of the director. It consisted of eight mem-
bers, of whom five were professors of economics. The
committee was supposed to judge whether it was
important for SSB to conduct research and what the
strategic goals for the agency should be, and to evaluate
the activities of the Research Division in terms of the
strategic goals and the implications for the future orga-
nization of the RD.
In its report, the committee concluded that the
SSB should continue conducting research and that
its research activities should be organized in
a research division (Bye, 2017). It put forward two
arguments to support the argument for RD’s
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organization and inclusion. First, the research in the
RD supported the work in the statistical divisions
and had an important function overall for economic
research of this kind in Norway. Second, the com-
mittee argued that there was an increasing need for
research-based knowledge about the empirical effects
of Norwegian economic policy and changes in socie-
tal and economic constraints and that the SSB was
a central provider of such knowledge.
The report established a modified definition of the
research goal of the agency, adding the requirement that
the research should be quality-assessed through publications
in internationally renowned journals. The report concluded
that current research was overall not of a high international
standard. The renowned professors of economy in the
committee argued that the macro-economic models used
at SSB were old-fashioned, weak and not in tune with
international top-level research, and should be renewed,
a view shared by rather few of the economists in SSB.
Based on a goal of delivering high-quality, long-
term research concentrated on selected areas, the
report proposed that the staff of the RD should be
reduced from around 80 to between 25 and 35
researchers and constitute a ‘center of excellence’. It
proposed moving the researchers who did not fulfill
international quality requirements to the statistical
divisions. Not much was said about the potential
effects of reducing the capacity of the RD. The report
also proposed various measures to improve working
conditions for researchers in the RD and stressed
that they continuously had to produce high-level
research.
Narrative 1 – the view of the agency’s director
Narrative 1, the one vigorously asserted by the director,
even after she had quit (Meyer&Norman, 2019), was based
on her contention that she had a clear mandate – an
instrumental element – from the ministry from day one
to reorganize the agency, since there was a clear need for
internal change at SSB, both in the three divisions for
statistics and in the RD, which alludes more to the need
for breaking a cultural path. She pursued this mandate
following up the report from the Bye Committee, propos-
ing changes both in the statistics divisions and in the RD.
The director also claimed to have the support of the internal
employees in her effort to rapidly bring about change.
However, when she heard – rather late in the process
according to her – that the ministry was skeptical about
the changes, she modified her proposal concerning staff
reductions in the RD to 40 researchers, which she still
thought was quite enough to cater to the needs of the
ministry.
In a rather dramatic and symbol-ridden end to her
narrative, the director claimed that her forced resignation
was a democratic problem, and that the professional inde-
pendence of the agency was at the heart of the matter. She
also thought that the minister had departed from the nor-
mal rules in publicmatters when she said publically that she
did not trust the director, which made her position unten-
able. The director argued in a letter to European colleagues
in November 24, 2017 that the minister’s resistance (she
represents a right-wing anti-immigration party) to the
reorganization was based on the fact that she had proposed
moving the foremost expert on immigration statistics from
the RD, and that this was because the director was seen as
Table 1. Timeline of the main events in the SSB case.
Time Event
2015 September A new director of Statistics Norway is appointed
2016 August The Bye committee is appointed by SSB
September 9 The ministry appoint a public commission on a new law of statistics
2017 January 5 The Bye committee submit its report proposing major changes in the Research Department, which are supported by the director
January 26 Meeting between the ministry and SSB on the Bye report. Ministry expresses worries about securing the SSB’s societal mission.
Reiterated in a meeting on April 24 with the board and director
April 26 Board meeting with the director. The board expresses reservations about the direction of the process.
September 18,
19
Meetings with the ministry and director on the reorganization, including the criteria for allocating researchers to the RD
October 23, 24 Criteria and actual allocation of researchers revealed
October 30. Meeting between the minister and director. Director announces that she will stop the reorganization until the next meeting.
November 8 Meeting between the minister and the director, between the administrative leadership and the director. A meeting scheduled for Nov.
10 did not happen because the director wanted to bring a lawyer with her.
November 10 The director gives a press conference attacking the minister, saying there is no reason to sack her and that SSB should not be dependent
on the trust of the minister, but should be independent and not subject to political control. The minister gives a press conference,
saying she does not trust the director.
November12 Agreement between the director and the ministry that she should quit.
November 14 The first of many letters from the Scrutiny and Control Committee to the ministry about the reorganization. The Committee decides on
Dec. 5 to hold an open hearing about the reorganization.




Two public hearings in the Scrutiny and Constitution Committee and the final report from the committee including criticism of the
minister from the majority of the Committee.
March 19 Report from the commission on a new law on statistics, clarifying and supporting political control.
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liberal on immigration issues and had tried to stop thework
on immigration statistics.
Narrative 2 – the ministerial view
This narrative was the one repeatedly espoused by the
minister of finance after the conflict erupted, shown in
both the open hearings and in numerous letters to the
Parliament. It conceded that modernization of SSB was
necessary, but that the ministry had been worried at
least since January 2017 about the direction of the
reorganization, i.e., an instrumental disagreement. The
ministry believed that the reorganization of the RD
failed to pay sufficient attention to the competence
related to the ‘societal mission’ of SSB and all the
contracts that the ministry was continuously signing
with the agency about the research it needed, which
alluded to cultural insensitivity. The minister asserted
that this concern had been expressed over a long period
of time in a ‘steering dialogue’, both formally and
informally.
he minister also denied, using many symbols, that
the lack of trust in the director had anything to do
with her views on immigration or the potential
removal of the immigration researcher from the
RD. It was also argued strongly that the ministry
had only used its superior instrumental position
and steering right to try to interfere in the reorgani-
zation process, because it was of great political sig-
nificance, and that the case had nothing to do either
with violating democratic rights or with limiting the
professional autonomy of the agency, which should
stay firm.
The views of other involved actors – joining up with
the two narratives
During the first hearing in SCSCA in 2018, the leader
and the deputy leader of the board said repeatedly that
they had warned the director about the direction of the
proposed reorganization in the board meeting in
April 2017. The director had written a memo about
the reorganization and instead of accepting it, as was
normal, the board had put it aside. The leader had then
formulated a decision proposal which expressed a lot of
reservations about the reorganization proposal; a view
which was then accepted by the board. Therefore, the
board apparently sided with narrative 2, even though
the director said she had the support of the board at
that time to continue the reorganization. The effect of
this contrary account was, however, not significant at
the time, because the board, surprisingly, had not had
contact with the ministry until November 2017, while
the director was in close touch with the ministry during
this period. This underlines the special role of the
board, i.e. it seemed to be more on the sidelines.
In the hearing, the representatives from the unions at
SSB said, again in a contrary statement to the director’s,
that the director had not involved them much in the
process, despite the unions having many concerns they
were not really accepted by the director. So overall, the
unions supported narrative 2. The unions were rather
critical about many aspects of the process. The concern
was that they thought that the Bye Committee was
biased, having been initiated by the leadership. It turned
out that the committee was composed mainly of a group
of economists who were very skeptical about the macro-
economic models used in the agency and wanted to have
new models, partly informed by microeconomics. These
views represented by some of the professors were also
seen as the source for the proposal that the RD should
contain a more limited group of top economic research-
ers. The committee’s report gave rise to a lot of internal
tension in the agency, which the director tried to alle-
viate by saying that the potential for change and the
speed of the process had been exaggerated, which the
unions in retrospect said was not true. When the criteria
were issued in October 2017 for deciding whether
employees should stay at the RD or not, the unions
and RD employees became even more worried.
The main external interest groups, the national orga-
nizations for employers and employees, which in the
tripartite Norwegian system see themselves as heavily
affected and interested in the activities of SSB, were
consulted in the process. They were overall skeptical
about the director’s proposals. Their concern, like the
minister’s, was what would happen to the ‘societal
mission’ tasks, meaning applied research that was use-
ful to them. In the parliamentary hearing, they were
very critical towards the director, which she responded
to later by saying she had been bullied by them. So
overall, these actors supported narrative 2.
A Statistical Law Commission was appointed by the
ministry in September 2016 and delivered its report in
March 2018 (NOU 2018: 7). It consisted of representa-
tives from ministries, research, interest groups and busi-
nesses. The significance of the committee in this case was
two-fold. First, the minister indicated that the internal
reorganization of SSB should wait for the committee’s
report. This was seen as a warning to the director to go
easy on the proposed changes, but also seen by critics as
obstruction, since they said that the committee’s work had
little significance for the internal reorganization
process. Second, the report clarified in the aftermath
several questions related to conflict in the process, reflect-
ing some of the effects of the internal process.
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The commission was given an additional mandate by
the minister in November 2017, based on the reorganiza-
tion process and related to the ‘societal mission’, which
touched the core of the question of political control versus
professional autonomy. The committee said that the min-
istry should decide on the agency’s tasks in order to
ensure that it delivered on societal mission, while profes-
sional autonomy should be related to how it enacted these
tasks. This could be seen as stating the control of the
ministry more clearly. The committee also proposed to
replace the board with an advisory council, to make the
line of command clearer. Overall, the committee’s report
could be seen as supporting narrative 2.
The SCSCA had two hearings about the SSB case, in
2018, where all the actors questions supported one of
the two main narratives. The report from the commit-
tee had a majority from the Labor Party, the Socialist
Left Party, the Centre Party and the Christian
Democratic Party, and a minority consisting of the
two parties forming the cabinet, the Conservatives
and the Progressive Party (Innst. 199 S (2017–2018)).
The majority mainly supported narrative 1. Its critique
of the minister was primarily related to its perception
of the ministry offering support for the reorganization,
rather than trying to stop it, and the alleged lack of
written proof that the minister became skeptical
towards the reorganization early on. Secondly, it criti-
cized procedure, such as the minister saying she did not
trust the director and allegedly amending memos from
meetings after they had been agreed on.
Theminority in the committee supportedmainly narra-
tive 2, arguing that although the minister had used her
formal power to give signals and interfere in the process,
this had not violated the professional autonomy of SSB.
They argued that the board had likewise signaled its reser-
vations early on, so it must have been obvious to the
director that the reorganization was problematic. In the
final vote in the parliament, the view of the majority in
the SCSCAwas supported by 54 votes to 49.At that point in
time, the political drama of the case had mostly evaporated
and the vote had little political importance for the minister.
Discussion – the theoretical perspectives
revisited
What are the insights in the process that one can gain
from the instrumental perspective? First, this is a case
related to a conflict over the balance between central
political-administrative control by the ministry and
professional autonomy of the agency. The minister
was worried that political steering, defined as related
to the agency’s ‘societal mission’ would be undermined
by the reorganization of the RD at SSB. Hence, even
though the internal reorganization of the SSB normally
would have been the prerogative of the director and
board, the minister had to interfere because it had
wider political implications. Many other actors – the
internal and external unions, the employers’ associa-
tion, the minority in the scrutiny committee and
Parliament and the Statistical Law Committee, sup-
ported this view, the core of narrative 2.
As far as the director of SSB was concerned, seen in
narrative 1, the central goal of the reorganization effort
was to improve the ability of the agency to deliver good
professional quality to the ministry, so the minister and
director perceived the potential effects of the reorgani-
zation quite different. The director argued that she had
the mandate and support from the ministry to enact the
reorganization. Furthermore, she had close informal
contact with the administrative leadership in the min-
istry during the reorganization, which she meant
pointed in the same direction. So instrumentally, the
director did not seem to oppose the overall balance
between political control and professional autonomy,
but her narrative was more related to what happened in
this particular process.
Second, did the director have reason to believe that
she had the support of the ministry in the reorganiza-
tion process, or was the director immune to several
warnings issued by the ministry and other actors
concerning the direction of the process? The answer
here seems to be mixed and somewhat ambiguous.
There is reason to believe that the ministry had
some concerns early on in the process, but they were
not very clearly expressed. The fact that the close
formal and informal contact between the director
and the administrative leadership in the ministry did
not lead to any action from the ministry until the
process was put on hold in late October 2017, maybe
seen primarily as a kind of passive acceptance. This
appears more likely given that it was difficult later on
for the ministry to produce written evidence to sup-
port its contention that the director had been warned
repeatedly. The argument against this view would be
that the director was on a mission and was therefore
not very open to stopping the process. According to
the leaders of the board, the director was warned in
April 2017, but the board never informed the ministry
about this, and the account given by the employees’
organizations also seem to contradict the director’s
claim of having their support.
Third, the close contact between the director and the
administrative leadership in the ministry during the
process, including a late offer from the director to
modify the size of the new RD and put the process on
hold, illustrates negotiation aspects of the process (cf.
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March & Olsen, 1983). The internal resistance at SSB
did not for most of the process much influence the
director. However, when the director realized the resis-
tance from the ministry, the pressure from the oppos-
ing forces gained momentum, and she would like to
negotiate, which was too late.
From a cultural perspective, first, the conflicts in the
process represented a potential break with a cultural
path for the agency (cf. Selznick, 1957). There seemed
to be a double threat towards the traditional profes-
sional path of the agency. The director and the Bye
Committee, on the other hand, consisting of some
internal leaders and external experts, supported narra-
tive 1 and a more thorough structural renewal of the
agency and its professional models, i.e. breaking the
traditional path. They opened the window-of-
opportunity to changing the agency (cf. Kingdon,
1984).
But, this is leading to a second important institu-
tional factor, there seems to have been strong veto
possibilities in the process (cf. Tsebelis, 2002). The
main veto player was the minister who late in the
process had the authority to stop the process. She
was strongly supported by two other potential veto
players, the employers’ and employees’ main organiza-
tions, which are strong stakeholders in the Norwegian
system in general and in economic policy more speci-
fically, and the agreement between them is rather
typical in a consensus-related tripartite system in ques-
tions like this. The unions within the agency were of
less importance as veto players, but they defended the
historical path both internally and externally.
Historically, the agency have had high discretion in
interpretation and enforcement of institutional change
and the action of the leadership seems to be a result of
institutional ‘drift’, meaning that they thought that it
has not kept up with external changes and therefore
needed substantial changes in profile and models,
whether seen as ‘displacement’ or ‘conversion’
(Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Their actions were, how-
ever, stopped by the main veto player, the minister,
with no changes in the short turn but more likely with
adding minor changes in a ‘layering’ process in the
long term.
Third, one might ask whether the minister balanced
political control and professional autonomy in an
appropriate way (cf. March & Olsen, 1989). She
obviously had the authority to interfere in the process
at SSB, but it is a more open question how easy it was
for the director to interpret the ministry’s will. It is
rather difficult to conclude that this was undemocratic,
however, as claimed by the director, in a system with
individual ministerial responsibility (Christensen,
2003). The majority in the SCSCA claimed that the
minister acted in an inappropriate way in the process
concerning procedures, which could mostly be seen as
reflecting traditional political norms expected from
opposition parties, without revealing what they thought
about the proposed substantial changes.
Another aspect is whether it was appropriate for the
minister to say, late in the process, that she did not
trust the director to adhere to the agency’s societal
mission in reorganizing the RD, which is what even-
tually led to the director’s resignation. Historically, this
is a rather unusual thing for a minister to say, but it is
within her steering rights vis-à-vis the director in an
agency system like Norway’s, with semi-autonomous
agencies where the minister has final political account-
ability towards the parliament for what goes on in the
agencies (Christensen, 2003). The minister also argued
that such an action was urgent, i.e. she used a kind of
‘force-majeure’ argument. Nevertheless, the director
was correct in her claim that this action by the minister
was rather uncommon and in some ways irregular.
Using the symbolic perspective entails looking for
myths and symbols from the main actors, both during
the process and in the aftermath (cf. Meyer & Rowan,
1977). Overall, the ambiguity in the process concerning
the balance between political control and professional
autonomy, and ambiguity in communication and inter-
action, led to a more intense use of symbols and more
conflict (cf. March & Olsen, 1976). First, the director of
the agency very much played a general ‘victim card’,
which consisted of several symbols. She saw herself as
a proactive director who had followed her mandate to
renew the agency and had been stopped in this endeavor
by the minister. She considered this problematic from
a democratic, a professional and a procedural reason (cf.
Carpenter, 2001). In accusing the minister of overstep-
ping her authority by interfering in the internal profes-
sional affairs of the agency, and in the modernization
process, she used the first two symbols. In addition, she
felt that the minister had departed from the appropriate
procedure by saying she did not trust her.
Second, the minister primarily used a symbol related to
the ‘societal mission’ of the agency, which is very potent in
a system of peaceful coexistence and with a focus on
collective values (Olsen, 2009). She stressed that the
main delivery from the SSB to the ministry, based on
contracts and projects, would be damaged by the reorga-
nization of the RD, and would undermine the capacity of
the ministry to be informed about and deal with the
societal effects of various economic policies. The employ-
ers’ and employees’ organizations strongly supported this
symbol, indicating that the potential change could
damage the tri-partite collaboration with the government,
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which is pretty ‘sacred’ in Norway (Christensen, 2003).
The magnitude of the symbols used here by these actors
seemed to be influenced by two factors. One is a feature of
retrospective rationalization, i.e. trying to be convincing
as ‘winners’ (March & Olsen, 1983; Røvik, 2002). The
other is the fact that the director did not give up easily,
but continued to press her case strongly even after her
resignation, in a kind of common understanding with the
majority in the SCSCA and major media outlets, which
polarized the debate and led to some kind of ‘the empire
strikes back’ effect.
Third, a combined modernity and quality symbol
was played out with respect to the Bye Committee.
Both leaders in the agency and some economics pro-
fessors emphasized that the research at the RD was old-
fashioned in terms of the models used and of low
quality, which was used as one of the main arguments
for reforming and slimming down the RD. This is
rather textbook use of a myth, like Brunsson (1989) is
pointing to, but also March and Olsen (1976) is allud-
ing to with the ‘worst-case scenario’. The counter-
symbol, stressed by the ministry, by many researchers
in the RD and by external interest groups, was that the
traditional macro-economic models were working well
and had been updated, that the quality of the work of
the RD was good and that there were few reasons to
transform RD into a division for top economics
researchers, which was the job of economy departments
at the universities. So, this was some kind of ‘we know
what we have’ argument.
Conclusion
How could a traditional context with high mutual long-
term trust relations between ministries and central
agencies and a consensus-oriented decision-making
style with high involvement of affected stakeholders
such as that in Norway, scoring high on autonomy
and low on politicization, lead to an atmosphere of
distrust and confrontation and the very rare event of
the resignation of an agency leader (cf. Olsen et al.,
1982)? And, that even in a traditional very peaceful
relationship. Three organization theory perspectives,
used in a complementary way, have been used to
explain the main features of this process.
An internal reorganization within SSB culminated in
a major and high profile conflict between the parent
minister and the agency head. In spite of frequent con-
tacts between the ministry and the agency, which is rather
normal negotiation procedure, the two organizations
were not able to come to a compromise and the conflict
escalated, also because of seemingly internal coordination
problems in the ministry. Instead of trying to balance
different role expectations such as loyalty, neutrality and
professional independence, the agency head tried to max-
imize the alleged autonomy of the agency, seen as a threat
to the historical path, while the minister cited the hier-
archy and the ministerial responsibility. In the end, when
the conflict escalated, and strong symbolic statements
were exchanges, the hierarchically based political control
card trumped the autonomy one and the agency leader
had to resign. Both external veto groups and internal
forces, as well as professional conflicts among economists
contributed to the process (cf. Mahoney & Thelen, 2010).
In handling the tension between political control and
professional autonomy both substantial and procedural
topics were addressed as well as insider-outsider relations
(cf. Carpenter, 2001). Thus, there is no one-factor expla-
nation for the outcome. This incident cannot be under-
stood purely in terms of a conflict between political
control and agency autonomy, but also related to
a cultural-professional path threatened and the strong
symbolic features.
Looking at this case as a crucial or critical case, six
main lessons for a general international audience can
be drawn. First, the logic of action based on consequen-
tiality and the rather clear rules for balancing political
control and autonomy could be problematic in conflict
situations, in particular in temporary low-trust situa-
tions and ambiguity in communication and interaction
(March & Olsen, 1989).
Second, modern agency leaders, believing in man-
agerial autonomy, may end up being strongly con-
trolled by the political leadership, resulting from
a process of politicization, i.e. in our case of the policy
field of statistics (cf. Maor, 1999). Giving public man-
agers more authority to manage reorganization can
result in political executives enhances their capacity
for intervening when the face what they see as political
threats. An interest point related to this is that
a Parliamentarian system like the Norwegian, tradition-
ally and currently characterized by agency autonomy,
has the potential of strong ministerial interference, and
as such not function that differently from a spoil system
like the US one.
Third, change is not only about simple rational
adaptation to new steering signals but also about
path-dependency, cultural appropriateness and veto
players (March & Olsen, 1989; Tsebelis, 2002). In
the end the agency leader did not pass the cultural
‘compatibility test’ (Brunsson & Olsen, 1993) and had
to resign due to a change process that conflicted with
the institutional tradition and culture. To establish
a ‘center of excellence’ in the research department,
was breaking with traditions, and probably an exam-
ple of a rather political insensitive idea.
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Fourth, participation, involvement, support and
consultation of different stakeholders can be particu-
lar important and critical to build a shared under-
standing in reform processes when actors do not
perceive their goals to be in alignment (Howard &
Bakvis, 2016). The director failed to build internal
and external alliances and compromises. An addi-
tional point is the dynamics inside the coalition gov-
ernment, where the Conservative Party and the
Progressive Party are the main partners. The agency
director is belonging to the Conservative Party and
was seen as close to the PM, while the minister from
the Progressive Party, who pushed her out, has often
preferred ‘alleingang’ in the coalition, allowed by the
PM, to further party interests, which could be
reflected in this case.
Fifth, the politics of change in public organizations
is not only about finding the best solution to pre-set
exogenously formulated goals, but also about mean-
ing-making and about symbols of tradition and mod-
ernity (cf. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Røvik, 2002). There
is no objective and tidy solution for handling the
dilemma of balancing political control and profes-
sional autonomy. Imperfect options have to be
assessed against other imperfect options. For an
agency leader, it is important to be able to register
and understand ambiguous and shifting signals from
their political principals, but in this case, her ‘victim-
oriented’ symbols clashed with the control and stabi-
lity symbols used by the minister.
Finally, the case illustrates the paradox that despite
the loss of authority of expert knowledge, the experts,
represented by the agency director, do not adapt their
ideas of knowledge and its relation to politics, and the
political executives do not abandon their reliance on
existing advisory arrangements (Weingast, 1999). The
coupling between expert knowledge and politics do not
come to a stable state. The boundaries between knowl-
edge and politics are blurred and creates imperatives
for selecting among variants of expertise.
References
Allison, G. T. (1971). Essence of decision. Boston, MA: Little,
Brown.
Brunsson, N. (1989). The organization of hypocrisy.
Chichester, UK: John Wiley.
Brunsson, N., & Olsen, J. P. (1993). The reforming organiza-
tion. London, UK: Routledge.
Bye. (2017, Jan 5). Research in SSB. Report from
a committee to discuss the future research strategy for
SSB. Oslo, Norway: SSB.
Carpenter, D. P. (2001). The forging of bureaucratic autonomy:
Reputations, network, and policy innovations in executive
agencies, 1862–1928. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Christensen, J. (2018). Economic knowledge and scientiza-
tion of policy. Policy Science, 51, 291–311. doi:10.1007/
s11077-018-9316-6
Christensen, T. (2003). Narrative of Norwegian governance:
Elaborating the strong state. Public Administration, 81(1),
163–190. doi:10.1111/1467-9299.00341
Christensen, T., Egeberg, M., Lægreid, P., & Trondal, J.
(2018). Sentralforvaltningen gjennom 40år. Stabilitet og
endring (The central civil service through 40 years.
Stability and change). Oslo, Norway: Universitetsforlaget.
Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2005). Trust in government –
The relative importance of service satisfaction, political
factors and demography. Public Performance &
Management Review, 28(4), 487–511.
Christensen, T., Lægreid, P., Roness, P. G., & Røvik, K. A.
(2007). Organization theory and the public sector.
Instrument, culture and myth. London, UK: Routledge.
Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963). A behavioral theory of the
firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Egeberg, M., & Trondal, J. (2009). Political leadership and
bureaucratic autonomy: Effects of agencification.
Governance, 22(4), 673–688. doi:10.1111/gove.2009.22.issue-4
Fischer, F. (2009). Democracy & expertise. Reorienting policy
analyses. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Gora, M., Holst, C., & Warat, M. (eds). (2018). Expertization
and democracy in Europe. London, UK: Routledge.
Greve, C., Lægreid, P., & Rykkja, L. H. (eds). (2016). Nordic
administrative reforms. Lessons for public management.
London, UK: Palgrave.
Howard, C., & Bakvis, H. (2016). Conceptualizing intera-
gency coordination as metagovernance: Complexity, dyna-
mism, and learning in Australia and British Statistical
Administration. International Journal of Public
Administration, 39(6), 417–428. doi:10.1080/
01900692.2015.1018427
Innst. 199 S. (2017-2018). Report from the Scrutiny and
Constitution Committee on the Handling of the
Reorganization of SSB. The Norwegian Parliament
Kingdon, J. (1984). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies.
Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
Lægreid, P., Roness, P. G., & Rubecksen, K. (2012). Norway.
In K. Verhoest, S. Van Thiel, G. Bouckaert, & P. Lægreid
(Eds.), Government agencies: Practices and lessons from 30
Countries (234–244). Chapter 22. London, UK: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Lægreid, P. (2014). New public management and public
accountability”. In M. Bovens, R. E. Goodin, &
T. Schillemans (Eds.), The oxford handbook of public
accountability (pp. 324–338). Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Levy, J. S. (2008). Case studies: Types, designs nd logics of
influence. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 25(1),
1–18. doi:10.1080/07388940701860318
Maggetti, M. (2007). De facto independence after delegation.:
A Fuzzy-set analysis. Regulation & Governance, 1(4),
271–294. doi:10.1111/rego.2007.1.issue-4
Maggetti, M., & Verhoest, K. (2014). Unexplored aspects of
bureaucratic autonomy: A state of the field and ways
forward. International Review of Administrative Sciences,
80(2), 239–256. doi:10.1177/0020852314524680
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 11
Mahoney, J., & Thelen, K. (2010). Explaining Institutional
change. Ambiguity, agency, and power. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Maor, M. (1999). The paradox of managerialism. Public
Administration Review, 59(1), 5–18. doi:10.2307/977475
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1976). Ambiguity and choice in
organizations. Bergen, Norway: Universitetsforlaget.
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1983). Organizing political life.
What administrative reorganization tells us about
government. American Political Science Review, 77,
281–297. doi:10.2307/1958916
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1989). Rediscovering Institutions.
New York, NY: The Free Press.
Marcussen, M. (2006). Institutional transformation? The
scientization of central banking as a case study. In
T. Christensen & P. Lægreid (Eds.), Autonomy and regula-
tion. Coping with agencies in the modern state (pp. 81–
109). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Meyer, C., & Norman, V. (2019). Ikke for å konkurrere. Strategi
for fellesskapets tjenere (Not for competing. Strategy for the
servants of the society. Bergen, Norway: Fagbokforlaget.
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutional organizations:
Formal structure as myth and ceremony. American Journal
of Sociology, 83(2), 340–363. doi:10.1086/226550
Moseng, E. (2019). Samfunnsoppdraget til SSB i fare? (The
societal mission of statistics Norway in danger?). Master
thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo.
NOU. (2018: 7). Ny lov om offisiell statistikk og Statistisk
Sentralbyrå (New law on public statistics and statistics
Norway). Oslo, Norway: Ministry of Finance.
Olsen, J. P., Roness, P. G., & Sætren, H. (1982). Norway: Still
coexistence and revolution in slow motion? In
J. J. Richardson (Ed.), Policy styles in Western Europe
(pp. 47–79). London, UK: Allen & Unwin.
Olsen, J. P. (2009). Democratic government, institutional
autonomy and the dynamics of change. West European
Politics, 32(3), 439–465. doi:10.1080/01402380902779048
Parliament. (2018a, January 10). Open hearing in the scrutiny
and constitution committee. Retrieved from https://www.
stortinget.no/no/Hva-skjer-pa-Stortinget/Horing/horing/?
h=10003909
Parliament. (2018b, March 1). Open hearing in the scrutiny
and constitution committee. Retrieved from https://www.
stortinget.no/no/Hva-skjer-pa-Stortinget/Horing/horing/?
h=10003926
Parliament. (2018c, April). Debate in the PARLIAMENT




Polidano, C. (1999). The Bureaucrat who fell under a bus:
Ministerial responsibility, executive agencies and the Derek
Lewis affair in Britain. Governance, 12(2), 201–229.
doi:10.1111/gove.1999.12.issue-2
Pollitt, C., Bathgate, K., Caulfield, J., & Smullen, A. (2001).
Agency fever? Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis:
Research and Practice, 3, 271–290. doi:10.1023/
A:1012301400791
Pollitt, C., Talbot, C., Caulfield, C., & Smullen, A. (2004).
Agencies: How governments do things through semi-
autonomous organizations. New York, NY:
PalgraveMacmillan.
Roness, P. G., Verhoest, K., Rubecksen, K., &
MacCarthaigh, M. (2008). Autonomy and regulation of
state agencies: Reinforcement, indifference or
compensation. Public Organization Review, 8, 155–174.
doi:10.1007/s11115-008-0057-4
Røvik, K. A. (2002). The secret of the winners:
Management ideas that flow. In K. Sahlin-Andersson &
L. Engwall (Eds.), The expansion of management knowl-
edge (pp. 113–144). Stanford, UK: Stanford University
Press.
Selznick, P. (1957). Leadership in administration. New York,
NY: Haråper & Row.
Simon, H. A. (1957). Administrative behaviour. New York,
NY: Macmillan.
Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto players. How political institutions
work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Turner, S. (2003). Liberal democracy 3.0. London, UK: Sage.
Van Thiel, S. 2012. Comparing agencies across countries. In
K. Verhoest, S. Van Thiel, G. Bouckaert & P. Lægreid
(Eds.), Government agencies. Practices and lessons form 30
countries. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Verhoest, K., Guy Peters, B., Bouckaert, G., &
Verschhuere, B. (2004). The study of organizational auton-
omy: A conceptual review. Public Administration and
Development, 24, 101–118. doi:10.1002/pad.316
Verhoest, K., Roness, P. G., Verschuere, B., Rubecksen, K., &
MacCarthaigh, M. (2010). Autonomy and control of state
agencies: Comparing states and agencies. Basingstoke, UK:
PalgraveMacmillan.
Verhoest, K., Van Thiel, S., Bouckaert, G., & Lægreid, P.
(eds). (2012). Government Agencies: Practices and lessons
from 30 countries. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wallis, J. (2001). Different perspectives on leadership in the
New Zealand public sector: The curious case of Christine
Rankin (Economics Discussion Papers Series No. 113).
University of Otago. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/
10523/949
Weaver, B. K., & Rockman, B. A. (1993). Assessing the Effects
of Institutions. In R. K. Weaver & B. A. Rockman (Eds.),
Do institutions matter? Government capabilities in the
United States and Abroad. (pp. 1–41). Washington, DC:
The Brookings Institution.
Weingast, P. (1999). Scientific expertise and political
accountability: Paradoxes of science in politics. Science
and Public Policy, 26(3), 151–161. doi:10.3152/
147154399781782437
Yesilkagit, K., & Christensen, J. G. (2009). Institutional
design and formal autonomy: Political versus historical
and cultural explanations. Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory, 20(1), 53–74.
doi:10.1093/jopart/mup002.
Yesilkagit, K., & Van Thiel, S. (2008). Political influence and
bureaucratic autonomy. Public Organization Review, 8(2),
137–153. doi:10.1007/s11115-008-0054-7
12 P. LÆGREID AND T. CHRISTENSEN
